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I. INTRODUCTION 
Home television watchers have long enjoyed the right to “time-
shift,” or record a program for later viewing.1  In the 1980s, time-shifting 
was accomplished using a videocassette recorder (VCR) and a blank 
tape.2  This technology was eventually replaced with digital video 
recorders (DVRs), devices that write television content onto a hard drive.  
The right of television watchers to time-shift was held to be fair use of 
copyrighted content by the Supreme Court in the landmark case Sony 
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.3  Time-shifting was 
recently put under renewed scrutiny regarding a novel digital video 
recording technology developed by Cablevision, a cable television 
provider.4  The Remote Storage Digital Video Recorder (RS-DVR) is a 
service that allows cable subscribers to record and play back video 
content in the absence of a set-top DVR.5  Instead, time-shifted programs 
are copied onto remote servers controlled and maintained at 
Cablevision’s head-end,6 a central facility that houses the hardware on 
which the content is copied and stored.7 
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more than just embodiments of data in RAM that failed to last for more than a transitory duration. 
 1. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454–55 (1984) 
(stating that “home time-shifting is fair use”). 
 2. See id. at 420 (stating that “[s]ome members of the general public use video tape recorders 
sold by petitioners to record . . . broadcasts”). 
 3. Id. at 454–55. 
 4. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
 5. Id. at 123–24. 
 6. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp. (Cablevision I), 478 F. Supp. 
2d 607, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), rev’d in part, vacated in part, Cablevision II, 536 F.3d 121. 
 7. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 124. 
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Section 106 of the Copyright Act prohibits the copying of 
copyrighted material by anyone other than the owner of the copyright.8  
The Copyright Act defines “copies” as “material objects . . . in which a 
work is fixed by any method . . . and from which the work can be . . . 
reproduced.”9  The Act further defines a copy as “fixed” when “its 
embodiment in a copy . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it 
to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of 
more than a transitory duration.”10 
The exact nature of this “duration” requirement is unclear because of 
a case brought by Cartoon Network and other content providers against 
Cablevision.11  The content providers alleged that by buffering 
copyrighted content in RAM, the RS-DVR infringed upon their exclusive 
reproduction rights.12  Cablevision denied that the buffered data were 
sufficiently fixed to constitute copies as defined by the Copyright Act.13  
Whether the buffered data met the duration requirement of section 101 of 
the Copyright Act was central to the suit.14  Holding in favor of 
Cablevision, the Second Circuit restricted its analysis of the duration 
requirement to a timeline.15  The court held that because the RS-DVR 
buffers data for no more than 1.2 seconds, the duration requirement was 
not met and the copyrighted works were thus not fixed in the buffer.16 
The timeline analysis employed by the Second Circuit in Cablevision 
II leaves in disarray copyright jurisprudence regarding data fixed in 
RAM.  Data fixed in RAM are typically created as part of an automated 
process that is entirely transparent to the user.17  The time that data are 
                                                     
 8. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (stating that “the owner of [the] copyright . . . has the exclusive 
right[] . . . to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies”). 
 9. Id. § 101. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d 121. 
 12. Id. at 123.  The plaintiffs in Cablevision II actually alleged three different copyright 
infringements by Cablevision.  First, by “briefly storing data [in RAM], Cablevision would make 
copies of protected works and thereby directly infringe plaintiffs’ exclusive right of reproduction.”  
Id. at 125.  Second, “by copying programs onto [hard disks owned and maintained by Cablevision], 
Cablevision would again directly infringe the reproduction right.”  Id.  Third, “by transmitting the 
data from [Cablevision’s hard disks] to its RS-DVR customers in response to a ‘playback’ request, 
Cablevision would directly infringe plaintiffs’ exclusive right of public performance.”  Id.  This Note 
will focus on the first allegation only. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 130. 
 16. Id. 
 17. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 107 (2001), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf [hereinafter DMCA 
REPORT]. 
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embodied in RAM can vary greatly because of the underlying hardware 
and software that controls the embodiment.  In light of modern computer 
technology, measuring the permanence of data fixed in RAM strictly on 
a timeline produces arbitrary results.  For example, the lawfulness of 
competing RS-DVRs may hinge on a length of time too small to be 
humanly perceived because one service uses more advanced hardware or 
more efficient software than the other.  The RS-DVR that is able to 
buffer RAM for a shorter length of time will be lawful, whereas one that 
buffers data for a greater length will be unlawful.  This confounding 
result is true even though the overall functions of the systems are 
identical.  In contrast, if the duration requirement were understood in 
terms of the purpose underlying the embodiment of data in RAM, the 
issue of duration would be rationally and fairly resolved. 
Part II of this Note describes in detail the duration requirement of the 
Copyright Act.  It also provides additional background information on 
the lawfulness of home time-shifting, beginning with the recording of 
television programs onto Betamax videocassettes in the early 1980s.  
Part II will also discuss the Cablevision cases as they relate to the 
duration requirement and data embodied in RAM.  Part III discusses how 
the Cablevision II court’s timeline analysis neither rationally resolves the 
issue of whether Cablevision’s RS-DVR meets the duration requirement 
nor provides an adequate test for future courts.  In addition, Part III 
introduces and discusses the purpose-based analysis of the duration 
requirement, an alternative to the timeline analysis that avoids the pitfalls 
inherent in the timeline analysis. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Copyright Infringement 
“To establish infringement, two elements must be proven: (1) 
ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements 
of the work that are original.”18  A copyright infringer is “anyone who 
trespasses into [the copyright holder’s] exclusive domain by using or 
authorizing the use of the copyrighted work” in a way prohibited by the 
Copyright Act.19  The owner of a copyright has the exclusive right to 
“reproduce the copyrighted work in copies.”20  This is the copyright 
                                                     
 18. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
 19. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984). 
 20. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
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holder’s “reproduction right”21 and anyone who violates it “is an 
infringer of the copyright.”22 
Conversely, a copyright holder’s reproduction right is not infringed 
when the reproduction is a “fair use” of the copyrighted work.23  “The 
fair use doctrine . . . ‘permits . . . courts to avoid rigid application of the 
copyright statute when . . . it would stifle the very creativity which that 
law is designed to foster.’”24  “The ultimate test of fair use . . . is whether 
the copyright law’s goal of ‘promot[ing] the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts’”25 “would be better served by allowing the use than 
preventing it.”26 
B. The Copyright Act’s Duration Requirement 
Consider a novel—reproduced by someone who later destroys the 
reproduction.  For how long must the novel be embodied in the 
reproduction before it is a copy?  In the early twentieth century, a copy 
could only be infringing if “perceptible to the naked eye.”27  The current 
Copyright Act, in contrast, provides a more nuanced duration 
requirement.  Section 101 of the Act provides that a work is fixed when 
it is “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than 
transitory duration.”28  The Copyright Act does not define transitory 
duration. 
The legislative history of the Copyright Act is informative on 
fixation and the duration requirement.  For example, the House Report 
provided that, “[i]f the program content is transmitted live to the public 
while being recorded at the same time” the content is fixed.29  “On the 
other hand, the definition of ‘fixation’ would exclude from the concept 
purely evanescent or transient reproductions such as those projected 
                                                     
 21. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 127. 
 22. 17 U.S.C. § 501. 
 23. Id. § 107. 
 24. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 
495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)). 
 25. Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 26. Id. (quoting Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1077 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
 27. 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.08[A][1] (2008); 
see also White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908) (stating that “[i]t is not 
susceptible of being copied until it has been put in a form which others can see”). 
 28. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 29. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665. 
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briefly on a screen . . . or captured momentarily in the ‘memory’ of a 
computer.”30  This language seems to exclude data embodied in RAM 
from the definition of fixed.  However, 
on investigation, that claim does not hold up.  The . . . House Report 
was formulated in an era of batch processing rather than personal 
computers—the same page of that report refers to “computer punch 
cards.”  In an age of punch cards, fixation in memory was indeed 
momentary.  By contrast, RAM copies in today’s environment often 
last far longer than momentarily—even for days or months.  
Accordingly, that language formulated in 1976 cannot be deemed to 
control those copies that remain in RAM for extended periods.31 
Congress was apparently aware that data embodied by automated 
computer systems might change the landscape of copyright law.  As 
stated in the House Report, “it has become increasingly apparent that in 
one major area the problems are not sufficiently developed for a 
definitive legislative solution.  This is the area of computer uses of 
copyrighted works: the use of a work ‘in conjunction with automatic 
systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring 
information.’”32  In this comment, the House Report explicitly 
acknowledged the issue of whether data are fixed within RAM 
embodiments by computer systems and reserved the issue for resolution 
until the Commission on New Technological Uses (CONTU), which was 
at the time conducting a “thorough study of the emerging patterns in this 
field,”33 made a definite recommendation “to deal with the situation.”34  
Congress later accepted CONTU’s recommendation that “the loading of 
software into a computer implicates the copyright owner’s rights, but is 
exempt from liability under specified circumstances.”35 
                                                     
 30. Id. at 53. 
 31. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 27, § 8.08[A][2]. 
 32. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 116. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 27, § 8.08[A][4].  While applicable to fixation and the 
duration requirement, CONTU’s recommendation was directed explicitly at 17 U.S.C. § 117, and the 
specified circumstances exempt from liability are included therein.  See NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION 
ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 12–13 (1978).  CONTU’s report refers to 
the Copyright Act’s definition of “copy” applying to machine-readable versions of works within the 
computer context.  Id. 
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C. Time-Shifting: A Trip Back to the ‘80s with a Betamax Machine 
The 1980s were a great time for television watchers.  The ‘80s gave 
us such veritable television classics as Miami Vice, Magnum, P.I., 
Cheers, and L.A. Law, as well as movies such as Fast Times at 
Ridgemont High, The Empire Strikes Back, and, of course, This is Spinal 
Tap.  In addition to an embarrassment of television riches, consumers of 
such fare had more choices than ever on how and when they watched 
television.  With the advent of VCRs, consumers had the option of 
“recording a program to view it once at a later time.”36  Sony advertised 
its version of the VCR,37 called Betamax, as a device that would provide 
home television watchers the ability to copy television programs for later 
viewing.38  The United States Supreme Court defined the practice as 
time-shifting in the landmark decision of Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc.39  The Court described it as enabling 
“viewers to see programs they otherwise would miss because they are 
not at home, are occupied with other tasks, or are viewing a program on 
another station at the time of a broadcast that they desire to watch.”40  
Time-shifting allowed people to watch any show whenever and as often 
as they liked, so long as they had a VCR and a tape on which to record 
the program.41 
At the time of the Sony case, members of the film and television 
industries responded negatively to the ability and right of consumers to 
copy television shows and movies at will.42  Just before the Sony case 
was decided, Jack Valenti, then-president of the Motion Picture 
Association of America, boldly declared that the film industry’s “total 
future depends on its protection from the savagery and the ravages of this 
                                                     
 36. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 423 (1984). 
 37. Technically, Sony’s device was a videotape recorder, or VTR.  See id. at 420.  For purposes 
of this Note, there is no difference between a VCR and a VTR, and the recording devices at issue in 
the Sony case will be referred to as VCRs. 
 38. See Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 5 (1982) 
[hereinafter Home Recording of Copyrighted Works] (statement of Jack Valenti, President, Motion 
Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc.) (“[T]hese machines [VCRs] are advertised for one purpose in life. . . . 
[T]heir only single mission . . . to copy copyrighted material that belongs to other people.”). 
 39. Sony, 464 U.S. at 423. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 422–23. 
 42. See Home Recording of Copyrighted Works, supra note 38, at 4 (statement of Jack Valenti, 
President, Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc.) (stating that the “video cassette recorder and the blank 
tape threaten profoundly the life-sustaining protection . . . on which copyright owners depend, on 
which film people depend, on which television people depend and it is called copyright”). 
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machine. . . . [T]he VCR is to the American film producer . . . as the 
Boston strangler is to the woman home alone.”43  In one respect, the 
overwhelmingly negative response by content providers was 
unsurprising.  The Sony case was considered 
unprecedented in the history of copyright litigation. 
 Perhaps one reason . . . lies in the fact that video cassette recorders 
constitute the most significant new development in the entertainment 
industry . . . since the introduction of television itself, with [millions of 
machines sold] . . . . And the [Court’s] decision has raised the spectre 
of making each and every use of these machines to date a copyright 
infringement.  
 Theoretically . . . [the Court’s decision] could subject millions of 
private citizens to damages for copyright infringement and subject the 
manufacturers and retailers of the recorders to a financial liability, 
perhaps, even exceeding their entire net worth . . . .44 
Despite the entreaties of the film industry, the Supreme Court in 
Sony held that home time-shifting was lawful.45  Two aspects of the Sony 
Court’s opinion are relevant to this Note.  First, because the content 
providers were unable to demonstrate that some likelihood of harm 
would result, the Court held home time-shifting to be fair use.46  
Therefore, individuals who choose to copy television programs using a 
VCR are not liable for copyright infringement.47  Second, Sony had  
demonstrated a significant likelihood that substantial numbers of 
copyright holders who license their works for broadcast on free 
television would not object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by 
private viewers.  And [plaintiffs] failed to demonstrate that time-
shifting would cause any likelihood of nonminimal harm to the 
potential market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works. . . . The 
Betamax is, therefore, capable of substantial noninfringing uses.  
Sony’s sale of such equipment to the general public does not [therefore] 
constitute contributory infringement of [plaintiffs’] copyrights.48 
                                                     
 43. Id. at 8. 
 44. Id. at 1–2 (statement of Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, 
Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 45. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456. 
 46. Id. at 454–55.  Fair use is defined as “[a] reasonable and limited use of copyrighted work 
without the author’s permission.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 676 (9th ed. 2009). 
 47. Sony, 464 U.S. at 454–55. 
 48. Id. at 456. 
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D.  Cartoon Network Gets Animated About Cablevision’s New RS-DVR 
1. The Evolution of Time-Shifting 
As the ‘80s waned, television watchers graduated from VCRs to 
DVRs.  As opposed to the tape-based technology of VCRs, DVRs stored 
video content on a hard drive within the device.49  Although the DVR 
substantially improved upon the convenience and functionality offered 
by its predecessors, the basic time-shifting purpose at its core remained 
the same.  Like VCRs, these devices allow home television watchers to 
record a program for later viewing.50  Furthermore, like VCRs, DVRs 
only record content when the user directs it to do so, typically by using a 
remote control.51  For example, if the DVR owner chooses not to record 
this week’s episode of The Simpsons, the device takes no action 
whatsoever in relation to that program. 
In March 2006, Cablevision announced plans to introduce the RS-
DVR.52  The RS-DVR, from the perspective of the time-shifting 
consumer, functioned identically to the set-top DVRs that Cablevision 
had been providing to its customers, for a fee, since 2004.53  While 
Cablevision ultimately controls which channels are available for time-
shifting by the RS-DVR system,54 the subscriber must choose to press 
the record button on the remote control if they want to time-shift any 
program.55  The on-screen menus, remote control, and recording and 
playback functionality all look identical on Cablevision’s RS-DVR 
compared to its set-top DVRs.56  From the customer’s perspective, 
the processes of recording and playback on the RS-DVR are similar to 
that of a standard set-top DVR.  Using a remote control, the customer 
can record programming by selecting a program in advance from an on-
screen guide, or by pressing the record button while viewing a given  
                                                     
 49. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp. (Cablevision I), 478 F. Supp. 
2d 607, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), rev’d in part, vacated in part, Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, 
Inc. (Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 614. 
 52. Id. at 609. 
 53. Id. at 612. 
 54. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 125. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 612. 
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program.  A customer cannot, however, record the earlier portion of a 
program once it has begun.57 
The primary function of Cablevision’s RS-DVR, as with its set-top 
DVR, is to give cable subscribers the ability to time-shift television 
content.58  The only difference, from the subscriber’s perspective, is that 
no hardware is physically present in the home; rather, the recording and 
storing of the content are all performed at Cablevision’s head-end.59  
Before rolling out the RS-DVR, Cablevision notified content providers 
of its intention to offer the product to subscribers.60  Cablevision sought 
no additional licenses from the content providers.61 
2. RS-DVR RAM Buffering 
For television watchers to remotely time-shift a program using the 
RS-DVR, Cablevision must manipulate the content as the programs are 
broadcast.  Ordinarily, Cablevision gathers the streams of program data 
from the various content providers, aggregates them into a single 
broadcast stream, “and transmit[s] those programs [in real time] into the 
homes of their subscribers via coaxial cable.”62  Under the RS-DVR 
system, however, this single stream of data is split into two separate 
streams—one stream is broadcast to the subscribers’ television sets, and 
the other continues through the RS-DVR for copying and rebroadcast 
purposes.63 
Before determining whether any customer record request exists for a 
program, the RS-DVR stores the data in several areas of RAM.  This 
action is taken solely by Cablevision before the RS-DVR receives any 
customer request.64 
It is undisputed that Cablevision, not any customer or other entity, 
takes the content from one stream of programming, after the split [of 
the broadcast stream], and stores it, one small piece at a time, in 
[RAM] . . . . As a result, the information is buffered before any 
                                                     
 57. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 125. 
 58. See id. at 124 (“[T]he RS-DVR allows Cablevision customers who do not have a stand-
alone DVR to record cable programming . . . . [C]ustomers may then receive playback of those 
programs through their home television sets.”). 
 59. Id. at 124–25. 
 60. Id. at 124. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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customer requests a recording, and would be buffered even if no such 
request were made.  The question is whether, by buffering the data that 
make up a given work, Cablevision “reproduce[s]” that work “in 
copies,” and thereby infringes the copyright holder’s reproduction 
right.65 
A brief overview of how data are stored in RAM will be helpful to 
understand the operation of Cablevision’s RS-DVR.  Data are stored in 
RAM differently than, for example, on a hard drive.  RAM-stored data 
only remain until either the power to the system is turned off or the data 
are overwritten.66  Furthermore, “[a]ll of the familiar activities that one 
performs on a computer . . . necessarily entail making reproductions in 
RAM.  These reproductions generally are made automatically, and 
transparently to the user—i.e., without the user being aware that copies 
are being made.”67 
In Cablevision’s RS-DVR system, the court looked at two areas of 
RAM when determining whether copyright infringement occurred.68  The 
first was the primary ingest buffer, which was the area of RAM in which 
the system queried all customer record requests to determine whether the 
data should ultimately be copied to the RS-DVR’s hard disks.69  The 
second area of RAM was the Broadband Media Router (BMR).70  The 
BMR “buffers the data stream, reformats it, and sends it to 
[Cablevision’s servers].”71  Specifically, the BMR “converts the bitrate 
of the stream” so that it is more efficient.72  The BMR also splits and 
reformats the stream so that it can be routed and stored on Cablevision’s 
hard disks.73  The RAM data at issue on the RD-DVR were never stored 
for more than one tenth of a second before being overwritten by new 
data.74  These data comprised at most 1.2 seconds of programming.75 
                                                     
 65. Id. at 127 (internal citation omitted). 
 66. DMCA REPORT, supra note 17, at 107. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 124. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp. (Cablevision I), 478 F. Supp. 
2d 607, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), rev’d in part, vacated in part, Cablevision II, 536 F.3d 121. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 124. 
 75. Id. at 124–25. 
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3. Cablevision I 
Copyright holders of television content responded negatively to 
Cablevision’s new product76 and sued Cablevision for declaratory and 
injunctive relief, alleging that operation of the RS-DVR would “infringe 
their exclusive rights to both reproduce and publicly perform their 
copyrighted works.”77  The district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the content providers and “enjoined Cablevision from operating 
the RS-DVR system without licenses.”78 
Cablevision’s RS-DVR system stores data in RAM to allow the 
system to reformat the data stream and “automatically inquire[] as to 
whether any customers want to record any . . . programming.”79  Cartoon 
Network claimed that Cablevision’s storing of data in RAM meant that 
its RS-DVR system unlawfully copied content as it was buffered.80  
Cablevision argued that the data buffered in RAM “were not ‘fixed’ and 
therefore were not ‘copies’ as defined by the Copyright Act.”81 
The district court concluded that the data buffered in RAM were 
sufficiently fixed.82  Because of the data embodied in RAM, entire 
programs were being reproduced.  Therefore, “[c]learly, the buffer copies 
are capable of being reproduced.”83  In addition, the district court found 
it significant that, when taken as a whole, the data embodied in RAM 
consisted of entire programs being buffered, albeit one small piece at a 
time.84 
                                                     
 76. See, e.g., Stephanie Clifford, Supreme Court Allows Wider DVR Use, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 
2009, at B6 (stating that “[b]esides the licensing issue, programmers are generally opposed to 
anything that makes DVRs more pervasive, because consumers using DVRs tend to skip 
advertisements”); John Eggerton, Outside the Box, DAILY VARIETY, June 30, 2009, at 1 (stating that 
“DVR’s ad-skipping function takes aim at the primary revenue source for the broadcast nets . . . to 
draw the mass audiences that command the biggest bucks from advertisers and use established 
shows as a springboard for launching others”); David G. Savage, Video On Demand Goes to Court: 
TV Networks & Film Studios Are Hoping that Justices Will Block a Cable Service They Say Violates 
Their Rights, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2009, at C3 (“TV networks and film studios said the appeals ruling 
was wrong as matter of law.  Unless it is reversed . . . it will have ‘sweeping implications in the 
digital age.’”). 
 77. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 124. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 125. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp. (Cablevision I), 478 F. Supp. 
2d 607, 621–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), rev’d in part, vacated in part, Cablevision II, 536 F.3d 121. 
 83. Id. at 621. 
 84. Id. 
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4. Cablevision II 
The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and vacated 
the injunction against Cablevision.85  The circuit court held that operation 
of Cablevision’s RS-DVR “would not directly infringe plaintiffs’ 
exclusive rights to reproduce and publicly perform their copyrighted 
works.”86  While the Second Circuit’s rationale included a discussion 
about the technical inner-workings of the RS-DVR system, ultimately it 
did not “believe that [the] RS-DVR customer is sufficiently 
distinguishable from a VCR user to impose liability”87 and followed the 
reasoning of Sony.  The court concluded that the language of the 
Copyright Act 
imposes two distinct but related requirements: the work must be 
embodied in a medium, i.e., placed in a medium such that it can be 
perceived, reproduced, etc., from that medium (the “embodiment 
requirement”), and it must remain thus embodied “for a period of more 
than transitory duration” (the “duration requirement”).  Unless both 
requirements are met, the work is not “fixed” in the buffer, and, as a 
result, the buffer data is not a “copy” of the original work whose data is 
buffered.88 
The Second Circuit further concluded that the 
district court mistakenly limited its analysis primarily to the 
embodiment requirement.  As a result of this error, once it determined 
that the buffer data was “[c]learly . . . capable of being reproduced,” 
i.e., that the work was embodied in the buffer, the district court 
concluded that the work was therefore “fixed” in the buffer, and that a 
copy had thus been made.89 
Regarding the embodiment requirement, it was not seriously disputed by 
the parties that the plaintiffs’ works were 
“embodied” in the buffer. . . . Data in the . . . buffer can be copied onto 
the . . . hard disks [of the RS-DVR system] if a user has requested a 
recording of that data.  Thus, a work’s “embodiment” in [the] buffer “is  
                                                     
 85. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 140. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 131. 
 88. Id. at 127 (internal citation omitted). 
 89. Id. 
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sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, [or] 
reproduced . . . .”90 
This was especially true in light of the fact that, in the aggregate, “every 
second of an entire work is placed, one second at a time, in the buffer.”91  
The critical question for the court, therefore, was whether the 
embodiment met the duration requirement.92 
The Cablevision II court concluded that the data buffered in RAM by 
the RS-DVR failed the duration requirement, and therefore no copies, as 
defined by the Copyright Act, existed.93  In making its decision, the court 
noted that the data buffered by the RS-DVR are “rapidly and 
automatically overwritten” as soon as they are processed, and data never 
reside in the buffer for more than 1.2 seconds before being overwritten.94 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Measuring the Immeasurable: How Long Is Transitory, Anyway? 
Transitory is an adjective, defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as 
“[t]hat passing from place to place; capable of passing or being changed 
from one place to another.”95  Using this definition, a facial reading of 
the Copyright Act provides that a work is fixed when its “embodiment in 
a copy . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, 
[or] reproduced”96 for a period or use greater than merely passing from 
place to place.  Other dictionaries define transitory more strictly as a 
word measuring duration on a timeline.  For example, Merriam 
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines transitory as “tending to pass 
away: not persistent,” or “of brief duration.”97  According to these 
sources, the Act would more appropriately be construed as meaning that 
a work is fixed when its “embodiment in a copy . . . is sufficiently 
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, [or] reproduced”98 for 
                                                     
 90. Id. at 129. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 130. 
 94. Id. 
 95. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1637 (9th ed. 2009). 
 96. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 97. MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1254 (10th ed. 1995); see also RANDOM 
HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1417 (1991) (defining transitory as “not lasting, 
enduring, permanent, or eternal” or “lasting only a short time; brief; short-lived; temporary”). 
 98. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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greater than a brief duration of time.  According to a 2001 report by the 
U.S. Copyright Office on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA), which was designed to “bring[] U.S. copyright law squarely 
into the digital age,”99 the Copyright Act 
does not define “transitory duration” directly.  Since permanence is not 
required for fixation, “transitory” must denote something shorter than 
“temporary.”  “Transitory” must also denote something less than 
“ephemeral,” as that term is used in the Copyright Act, since the Act 
confirms that “ephemeral recordings” are fixed by providing a specific 
exemption for “ephemeral recordings” lasting up to six months.  Courts 
have not attempted to formulate a general rule defining how long a 
reproduction must endure to be “fixed,” deciding instead on a case-by-
case basis whether the particular reproduction at issue sufficed.100 
The Second Circuit, in Cablevision II, construed transitory strictly 
on a timeline, stating that “[n]o bit of data remains in any buffer for more 
than a fleeting 1.2 seconds . . . [and] each bit of data . . . is rapidly and 
automatically overwritten as soon as it is processed.”101  While noting 
that the duration requirement was “necessarily fact-specific, and other 
factors not present here may alter the duration analysis significantly,”102 
in the present case, the facts “strongly suggest that the works . . . are 
embodied in the buffer for only a ‘transitory’ period, thus failing the 
duration requirement.”103  The court declined to give any examples of the 
absent factors that could significantly alter the duration requirement 
analysis. 
Rather than construing transitory duration strictly on a timeline, the 
Copyright Office construed Congress’s intent as restricting reproductions 
“from which economic value can be derived.”104  Further, 
[t]he economic value derived from a reproduction lies in the ability to 
copy, perceive or communicate it.  [Thus] [u]nless a reproduction 
manifests itself so fleetingly that it cannot be copied, perceived or 
communicated, the making of that copy should fall within the scope of 
the copyright owner’s exclusive rights.  The dividing line, then, can be 
drawn between reproductions that exist for a sufficient period of time to 
be capable of being ‘perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
                                                     
 99. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998). 
 100. DMCA REPORT, supra note 17, at 110–11. 
 101. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121, 129–30 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
 102. Id. at 130. 
 103. Id. 
 104. DMCA REPORT, supra note 17, at 111. 
BULLER FINAL 3/16/2011  1:20:47 PM 
2011] COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT IN THE ETHER 673 
communicated’ and those that do not.  As a practical matter . . . this 
would cover the temporary copies that are made in RAM in the course 
of using works on computers and computer networks.105 
The Copyright Office came to this conclusion because 
attempting to draw a line based on duration may be impossible. . . . 
Even if this distinction were possible under the statute, the concept of 
permanence is not helpful in this context.  Magnetic disks and tapes can 
be erased; printed works decompose over time, or can be destroyed 
deliberately or accidentally.  Separating some temporary copies from 
others based on their duration poses similar difficulties.  How 
temporary is temporary?  Hours?  Minutes?  Seconds?  Nanoseconds?  
The line would be difficult to draw, both in theory and as a matter of 
proof in litigation.106 
The DMCA Report buttressed its conclusion that RAM copies 
typically meet the duration requirement by noting that section 117 of the 
Copyright Act provides that “it is not an infringement for the owner of a 
copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another 
copy . . . of that . . . program” so long as the created copy is “an essential 
step in the utilization of the computer program [solely] in conjunction 
with a machine” or that the copy is solely for “archival purposes.”107  
The “new copy” referenced in section 117 “is the copy made in RAM 
when the program is executed.”108  The DMCA Report concluded that 
section 117 would not have been necessary “if reproductions in RAM 
could not be copies.  It would be unreasonable to interpret the definitions 
in section 101 in such a way that it would render section 117 
superfluous.”109  In the end, the DMCA Report concluded that a copy is 
within the copyright owner’s exclusive rights unless it “manifests itself 
so fleetingly that it cannot be copied, perceived or communicated.”110 
The Cablevision II court rejected the Copyright Office’s duration 
analysis because, “[a]ccording to the [DMCA Report], if the work is 
capable of being copied from that medium for any amount of time, [the 
duration requirement is met].  The problem with this interpretation is that 
it reads the ‘transitory duration’ language out of the statute.”111 
                                                     
 105. Id. at 111–12. 
 106. Id. at 113. 
 107. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2006). 
 108. DMCA REPORT, supra note 17, at 113. 
 109. Id. at 113–14. 
 110. Id. at 111. 
 111. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121, 129 (2d Cir. 
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B. Cablevision II’s Timeline Analysis 
The Cablevision II court acknowledged that data held in RAM can 
sometimes be sufficiently permanent as to satisfy the duration 
requirement.112  In so doing, the court discussed MAI Systems Corp. v. 
Peak Computer, Inc., a case in which a computer repair company loaded 
copyrighted software into a computer’s RAM so employees could view 
the system error log and diagnose system problems.113  In MAI Systems, 
the Ninth Circuit held that the software loaded into RAM was fixed as 
required by the Copyright Act.114  The court’s rationale was that the 
loading of software into RAM creates a copy under the Copyright Act 
because “the copy created in the RAM can be ‘perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated.’”115  The Cablevision II court construed MAI 
Systems as “holding that loading a program into a computer’s RAM can 
result in copying that program.  We do not read MAI Systems as holding 
that . . . loading a program into . . . RAM always results in copying.  
Such a holding would read the ‘transitory duration’ language out of the 
definition.”116  In fact, the court found the holding of MAI Systems 
“unsurprising, because it seem[ed] fair to assume that” the program was 
embodied in RAM for “at least several minutes.”117 
The Cablevision II holding that RAM copies can amount to copies as 
defined by the Copyright Act is rational because “RAM copies in today’s 
environment often last far longer than momentarily—even for days or 
months.”118  So, by extension, “[a] crucial aspect of [the] MAI ruling 
[must have been] that the RAM copies at issue there [were] long-lasting.  
The case cannot support a reading that momentary passage through RAM 
creates a ‘copy’ that implicates the proprietor’s rights.”119 
The Cablevision II opinion provides a clear interpretation of the 
Copyright Act’s duration requirement for an embodiment to be fixed, 
namely, that the duration requirement is to be understood as strictly 
that—a duration of time or timeline analysis.120  Further, the court 
                                                                                                                       
2008). 
 112. Id. at 128. 
 113. 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 114. Id. at 519. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 128. 
 117. Id. 
 118. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 27, § 8.08[A][2]. 
 119. Id. § 8.08[A][5][b]. 
 120. See Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 129–30 (“No bit of data remains in any buffer for more than 
a fleeting 1.2 seconds.  And, unlike the data in cases like MAI Systems, which remained embodied in 
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provided limits for both what is greater than a transitory duration 
(embodiment in RAM for at least several minutes, as in MAI Systems),121 
and what is not greater than a transitory duration (embodiment in RAM 
for 1.2 seconds, as in the RS-DVR).122  Unfortunately, the court’s 
interpretation provides very little guidance for other courts analyzing 
similar cases.  Whether data embodied in RAM for between 1.2 seconds 
and several minutes is sufficiently permanent to meet the duration 
requirement remains unanswered.  Moreover, other courts have no 
guidance on whether other factors that could “alter the duration analysis 
significantly”123 are present in the case before them since those factors 
are left unspecified in Cablevision II. 
C. The Purpose-Driven Durational Requirement: An Alternative Test 
1. Problems with the Timeline Analysis 
Cablevision II’s timeline analysis is fraught with problems.  First, the 
test is impossibly vague.  As a practical matter, the only situation to 
which the timeline analysis can definitely be applied is Cablevision’s 
RS-DVR device as it existed at the time of the decision.  Indeed, even 
future iterations of Cablevision’s system could fall short of the timeline 
analysis.  The Cablevision II court stated that “loading a program into a 
computer’s RAM can result in copying that program.”124  So it is 
possible that some version of the RS-DVR could embody data in RAM 
with sufficient permanence to satisfy the duration requirement under the 
timeline analysis.  For example, the timeline analysis provides no clear 
answer on whether the data are sufficiently permanent to exceed a 
transitory duration if enhancements are made to the RS-DVR (or a 
software bug emerges) that causes the buffered data to remain in RAM 
for more than 1.2 seconds.  Considering non-Cablevision II RS-DVR 
scenarios, it is easy to imagine a case in which an embodiment of data 
always or sometimes lands in the magic range of uncertain fixation—
namely, between 1.2 seconds and several minutes. 
                                                                                                                       
the computer’s RAM memory until the user turned the computer off, each bit of data here is rapidly 
and automatically overwritten as soon as it is processed.”). 
 121. See id. at 128 (agreeing with the MAI Systems holding that data copied into RAM met the 
duration requirement because “the program was embodied in RAM for at least several minutes”). 
 122. See id. at 129–30 (holding that the duration requirement is not met when “no bit of data 
remains in any buffer for more than a fleeting 1.2 seconds”). 
 123. Id. at 130. 
 124. Id. at 128. 
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Second, while providing adequate results in certain circumstances, 
the timeline analysis is an anachronistic approach to the duration 
requirement when computer-driven processes are at issue.  The timeline 
analysis works best when addressing embodiments of works viewed and 
understood by human beings in real-time.  For example, the Cablevision 
II court noted approvingly that, under the MAI Systems facts, the timeline 
analysis works nicely: (1) a computer malfunctions, such that it will no 
longer boot up; (2) a computer technician loads unlicensed software into 
RAM; (3) while doing so, the technician is able to make use of the 
unlicensed software to diagnose and repair the system.125  The software 
was embodied in RAM long enough for humans to initiate it, view its 
output, and use it to repair systems.126  The court reasoned that the 
timeline analysis was met because “the program was embodied in the 
RAM for at least several minutes.”127  The court also mentioned that a 
different result could have potentially occurred if the computer had been 
shut down within seconds or less after loading the program.128  While not 
expressly stating why several minutes meets the duration requirement but 
slightly more than a second does not, a reasonable assumption is that the 
difference lies in the fact that a human technician would be unable to 
view or perform anything in seconds or a fraction of a second but could 
easily do so in several minutes.  In other words, the timeline analysis is 
rooted in the logic of 1908 copyright jurisprudence: “an ‘infringing’ copy 
must be perceptible to the naked eye.”129 
In contrast, the timeline analysis is weakest when computer-based, 
automated processes embody the data at issue.  Because of the rapidity 
with which computers are able to complete tasks, many embodiments of 
data that should meet a timeline analysis will inevitably fail it, thus 
protecting would-be infringers. 
Data are often embodied in RAM with insufficient permanence for 
humans to possibly perceive or understand in real-time.  Nonetheless, 
these embodiments could perform functions against that data identical to, 
and even more far-reaching than, the software used in MAI Systems.  
Cablevision II’s timeline analysis effectively draws a line with human-
based operations on the infringing side and automated, computer-based 
                                                     
 125. Id. at 127–28. 
 126. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 127. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 128. 
 128. Id. at 128–29. 
 129. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 27, § 8.08[A][1]; see also White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. 
v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908) (“It is not susceptible of being copied until it has been put in a 
form which others can see.”). 
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operations on the noninfringing side.  It makes no legal difference to the 
timeline analysis that both sides are performing precisely the same 
function—the only thing that matters is the length of time the function 
takes to perform.  Practically, however, the difference is huge.  Because 
the computer-based side inevitably takes a very short time to perform, 
the timeline analysis will confirm that its embodiment was insufficiently 
permanent to meet the duration requirement.  The reproduction will 
therefore not constitute an infringing copy.  In contrast, the human-based 
operation will inevitably take longer, and in all likelihood, at least a few 
minutes longer than a computer-based operation.  The timeline analysis 
will respectively confirm its embodiment as sufficiently permanent to 
meet the duration requirement and to make the reproduction an 
infringing copy.  Declaring one copy infringing and another lawful, 
based solely on the relative time it takes to delete the embodiment, 
produces arbitrary results and illustrates a weakness of the timeline 
analysis. 
Finally, there will almost always be factors that were not present in 
Cablevision II that could “alter the duration analysis significantly.”130  
These factors are neither defined nor does the Cablevision II court 
indicate under what circumstances they might come into play.  Other 
courts could conceivably recognize that certain factors would provide the 
timeline analysis with more reasonable results.  One such factor would 
be whether the purpose underlying the embodiment of the data was 
dependent on human perception and understanding or mere computer-
based processes.  As discussed above, human-based processes inevitably 
take longer to complete than their computer-based counterparts.  If courts 
looked at this as a factor on which their analysis was based, the timeline 
analysis’s results may be more rational.  Unfortunately, the Cablevision 
II court implicitly rejected this factor when it concluded that 
Cablevision’s RS-DVR failed the duration requirement without 
addressing the purpose underlying the embodiment of data 
whatsoever.131  In the end, other than knowing that courts should look at 
transitory duration on a timeline, it is difficult to see how Cablevision 
II’s timeline analysis will produce rational results. 
                                                     
 130. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 130. 
 131. Id. 
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2. Alternative Analyses 
a. Defining Fixed—Take One 
A work is fixed when its embodiment in a copy is sufficiently 
permanent to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.132  The 
Copyright Act defines three distinct elements of fixed.  An embodiment 
can be fixed when it is (1) perceived, (2) reproduced, or (3) otherwise 
communicated.133  Courts can construe this definition in several ways.  
Under one construction, “for a period of more than transitory duration” 
strictly modifies the final element in the series, i.e., the copy’s ability to 
be “otherwise communicated.”  This definition would include any time a 
copy is embodied with sufficient permanence that anyone or anything 
could ever perceive or reproduce it; then the embodiment would be fixed 
and a copy could exist.  This interpretation would also mean that an 
embodiment would not be sufficiently permanent to be fixed if it could 
not be otherwise communicated for a transitory duration or less, which 
would naturally require a definition of transitory. 
Applied to the facts of Cablevision II, this interpretation of fixed 
would have changed the outcome completely.  The buffering of content 
in RAM by the RS-DVR clearly embodied the data in a copy with 
sufficient permanence that it could be reproduced.  Indeed, buffering the 
data for reproduction is part of what the RS-DVR does.  Data are split off 
from the typical broadcast stream and sent to several RAM buffers so 
that the system can reformat the content stream and determine whether a 
customer record request exists.134  The primary ingest buffer, which runs 
a query to see whether any customer record requests exist,135 satisfies the 
reproduced requirement for an embodiment of data to be fixed under this 
interpretation.  The primary ingest buffer’s sole purpose is to buffer the 
data while the RS-DVR determines whether any customer record request 
exists so that it can subsequently copy the data onto the Cablevision 
server.  This clearly meets the definitional requirement that the copy be 
embodied with sufficient permanence so that it can be reproduced—that 
is the whole point of the primary ingest buffer.  On the other hand, the 
buffering performed by the BMR would fall under the “otherwise 
                                                     
 132. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 124. 
 135. Id. 
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communicated for a period of more than transitory duration” part of 
section 101 of the Copyright Act under this alternative interpretation.136  
As with Cablevision II’s construal of the Act, determining whether the 
BMR buffering constituted copyright infringement would require a 
definition of transitory, though it would be unnecessary to continue the 
analysis once it was determined that the primary ingest buffer’s 
embodiment of data was fixed. 
The first problem with this interpretation of fixed is that the question 
of what constitutes sufficient permanence to meet the duration 
requirement—namely, what is transitory duration—remains unanswered.  
Second, why courts should read the duration requirement out of the 
statute for data that can be perceived or reproduced but still apply it to 
data that can be otherwise communicated is unclear.   
b. Defining Fixed—Take Two 
Another way to interpret section 101’s definition of fixed is to 
construe “of more than transitory duration” as modifying all three 
elements of the definition of fixed but understanding transitory duration 
as a measurement not strictly confined to a timeline.  For example, if 
Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of transitory applies, the statute 
would read: “A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when 
its embodiment in a copy . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit 
it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period” 
greater than merely “passing from place to place.”137  In other words, if 
the purpose of the perception, reproduction, or communication is merely 
a conduit for the information to move from place to place, the work is 
not embodied with sufficient permanence to meet the duration 
requirement.  This is the purpose-based analysis.  The court in 
Cablevision II rejected the notion that a copy was fixed outside of a 
timeline because it thought that this would “read[] the ‘transitory 
duration’ language out of the statute.”138  Of course, the court is 
assuming that it should understand transitory duration strictly on a 
timeline.  Once the notion of transitory is separated from a strict timeline 
and understood in terms of the purpose being served by the RAM 
embodiment, the duration requirement remains alive and well. 
                                                     
 136. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 137. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1637 (9th ed. 2009). 
 138. See Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 129 (stating that an interpretation which made a work 
“capable of being copied from that medium for any amount of time” is unacceptable because “it 
reads the ‘transitory duration’ language out of the statute”). 
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Other courts have used a purpose-based analysis when considering 
the definitional duration requirement of section 101.  For example, in 
2004, the Fourth Circuit held: 
When an electronic infrastructure is designed and managed as a conduit 
of information and data that connects users over the Internet, the owner 
and manager of the conduit hardly “copies” the information and data in 
the sense that it fixes a copy in its system of more than transitory 
duration.  Even if the information and data are “downloaded” onto the 
owner’s RAM or other component as part of the transmission function, 
that downloading is a temporary, automatic response to the user’s 
request, and the entire system functions solely to transmit the user’s 
data to the Internet.139 
Certain amici curiae who submitted briefs in favor of the Cablevision 
II holding were apparently aware that a purpose-based construal of fixed 
would damage their interests and sought to deter any such reading by 
focusing on the ubiquity of RAM copies in practically all interactions 
with technology.140  For example, in one such brief, amici stated: 
 It is a truism of the digital age that digital devices must copy 
information into transient “buffers” in random access memory (RAM) 
in order to process that information.  None of the digital devices now 
available in the marketplace—computers, cell phones, personal digital 
assistants (PDAs), MP3 and compact disk players . . . could function 
without the regular and automatic creation of such transient “buffer” 
copies . . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . [T]he District Court ignored the plain text and legislative history 
of the Copyright Act, both of which make clear that such ephemeral, 
transitory reproductions are not sufficiently “fixed” to constitute 
“copies.” . . . Under the District Court’s ruling, [in Cablevision I,] each 
and every lawful use of a digital device of any kind—turning on a 
digital TV, or browsing a website on the Internet—becomes an act 
fraught with potential copyright liability: If the content involved is 
protected by copyright, the user will need some form of 
“authorization,” or some other defense, for creating the temporary 
buffer copies that these devices automatically and inevitably make 
when processing digital information.  That rule would create . . . an  
                                                     
 139. CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550–51 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 140. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Defendants-Counterclaimants-
Appellants & Reversal at 1–3, Cablevision II, 536 F.3d 121 (Nos. 07-1480-cv(L), 07-1511-
cv(CON)), 2007 WL 6101595. 
BULLER FINAL 3/16/2011  1:20:47 PM 
2011] COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT IN THE ETHER 681 
exclusive monopoly over the “right to read” (or watch, or hear, or 
access in any way) digital information.141 
While it is true that Cablevision’s RS-DVR “inevitably and 
automatically” embodies the data in RAM when determining whether 
any customer record requests exist, it does so specifically because that is 
the way that the system was designed.142  Further, whether the data 
buffered in RAM by Cablevision’s RS-DVR are as “ephemeral and 
transitory” as amici contend is questionable.  Amici’s entire statement is 
based on the proposition that digital devices buffer data as a necessary 
byproduct of their basic operation.143  In contrast, Cablevision’s primary 
ingest buffer is not merely buffering data in RAM as a natural 
consequence of being a digital device—or, in this case, of being one 
small component of a larger, digital-based system.  Rather, the primary 
ingest buffer performs an operation outside of natural digital functioning: 
it queries the database of customer record requests to determine whether 
any exist for the content it is currently buffering.144 
Because the primary ingest buffer performs an operation outside of 
the scope of the basic RAM processing that occurs for any digital device, 
the timeline analysis, adopted by the Cablevision II court—and the amici 
quoted above145—falls short.  Founding the analysis upon the ever-
changing technology on which the RS-DVR essentially relies will prove 
to be a fickle friend of RS-DVR providers.  For example, the timeline 
analysis is an ally of the RS-DVR provider on Monday, before a 
software bug emerges, because the system in which data were embodied 
takes a mere 1.2 seconds to perform the customer record request checks.  
On Tuesday, after a software bug emerges and the timeline analysis 
becomes an enemy of the same RS-DVR service provider because the 
buffering process now takes ten minutes to accomplish the customer 
                                                     
 141. Id. 
 142. See Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 124 (“If a customer has requested a particular program, the 
data for that program move from the primary buffer into a secondary buffer, and then onto a portion 
of one of the hard disks.”). 
 143. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors, supra note 140, at 1 (“It is a truism of the digital 
age that digital devices must copy information into transient ‘buffers’ in random access memory 
(RAM) in order to process that information.”). 
 144. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 124. 
 145. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors, supra note 140, at 3 (urging the Cablevision II 
court to reject the district court’s conclusion that “all transient RAM reproductions—no matter how 
brief or fleeting—constitute fixed ‘copies’ within the meaning of the Copyright Act.  Instead, this 
Court should hold that momentary RAM reproductions that are automatically and necessarily created 
as digital devices processes digital data, and which are destroyed almost immediately after they are 
created—such as the buffer copies in Cablevision’s RS-DVR system—are not fixed copies.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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record request checks.  On Monday, the RS-DVR did not violate the 
Copyright Act; on Tuesday, it did.  Such drastic differences in result 
show how flawed the timeline analysis is when applied to automated 
processes performed by computer systems. 
If courts continue to follow the timeline analysis, a fair determination 
of whether the device infringes the content providers’ exclusive rights 
will either produce unfair results or require hopelessly technical 
evaluations of the hardware platforms as well as the software efficiencies 
that underlie the processes.  If, for example, a cable company releases the 
RS-DVR II, but, for whatever reason, the data remain embodied in the 
primary ingest buffer for five minutes instead of 1.2 seconds, the RS-
DVR II may very well infringe on a copyright.  Using the timeline 
analysis, a court could simply declare the system to directly infringe on 
the content providers’ exclusive copyrights, in which case Cablevision’s 
RS-DVR would be lawful, but the RS-DVR II, which performs the exact 
same function as the RS-DVR, would be unlawful.  On the other hand, 
the court could attempt to perform an analysis taking into account the 
relative system power and software efficiencies.  For example, if the RS-
DVR has four times the system power and one-fourth of the system 
inefficiencies as the RS-DVR II, the court may conclude that the RS-
DVR II does not infringe.  Unfortunately, this type of analysis becomes 
hopelessly complex, time consuming, and expensive. 
Not only is the timeline analysis impossible to apply rationally, it 
arguably runs contrary to the underlying motivation behind the Supreme 
Court’s pursuit of media-neutral copyright jurisprudence—typified by 
the holding in Sony.146  The basic purpose against which courts should 
construe the Copyright Act is to “stimulate artistic creativity for the 
general public good” by “secur[ing] a fair return for an ‘author’s’ 
creative labor.”147  By tying the legality of RS-DVR services to a strict 
timeline148 the Second Circuit tethered its jurisprudence to the 
technology of the moment, thereby overlooking this basic purpose of 
copyright law. 
In contrast, if the purpose-based analysis is used, courts will be able 
to fairly determine whether a RAM-based embodiment of data infringes, 
not by the duration of time the copy remains embodied, but by whether 
                                                     
 146. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431–32 (1984) 
(“‘When technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be 
construed’” such that by incentives, artistic creativity is stimulated “‘for the general public good.’” 
(quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975))). 
 147. Id. at 432. 
 148. See Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 130. 
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the RAM copy is a natural byproduct of digital operation and the purpose 
behind the embodiment.  A RAM copy—such as the RS-DVR’s primary 
ingest buffer, for example—would meet the duration analysis because 
the purpose of the buffer copy was not merely to pass the data from one 
location to another.  Because the RS-DVR’s primary ingest buffer 
performs an operation against the data that is not intrinsic to the essential 
operation of digital devices—specifically, to query the data regarding 
whether any customer record requests exist—it would constitute an 
infringement of the content holders’ copyrights.  Furthermore, as other 
cable television companies develop their own version of the RS-DVR—
which will surely happen149—the inconsistent results of the timeline 
analysis will not occur.  As long as the RAM-based copy at issue has a 
purpose outside of what is allowed by the statute—namely, use for a 
purpose greater than moving the data from place to place—it will 
infringe.  This will be true regardless of hardware power, software 
efficiencies, or even software bugs.  The purpose-based analysis, 
therefore, provides a rational framework upon which courts can 
determine the permanence of data embodiments.  Moreover, by 
providing courts a media-neutral, rational basis on which to construe the 
meaning of the Copyright Act, the purpose-based analysis meets the 
basic purpose of the Copyright Act—as elucidated in Sony.150 
Applying the purpose-based analysis to the facts of Cablevision II, 
the content providers might have prevailed.  As stated above, because the 
RS-DVR’s primary ingest buffer reproduces the embodiment in a copy 
for a purpose greater than to move the data from place to place, it would 
meet the duration requirement of section 101—making the RAM copies 
an unlawful reproduction of the plaintiffs’ protected content.  This result 
certainly would not mean the end of RS-DVR and similar technologies.  
A cable television company using RS-DVR technology could acquire 
additional licenses for the content before offering the RS-DVR service to 
its customers.  Alternatively, if a cable television company does not 
obtain licenses, and if the purpose-based analysis leads to a finding that 
the RS-DVR service infringes, the company could still defend by 
invoking Sony.  The defense essentially would be that, just like the 
Betamax in Sony, the RS-DVR service facilitates fair-use copying by 
                                                     
 149. Other cable companies will certainly follow Cablevision’s lead in developing remote DVR 
technology because they will increase profit “by reducing their operational costs through removing 
the need for DVR boxes in subscriber households.”  Megan Cavendar, Recent Development, RS-
DVR Slides Past Its First Obstacle and Gets the Pass for Full Implementation, 10 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 
145, 164 (2008). 
 150. Sony, 464 U.S. at 432. 
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consumers.  As the Second Circuit concluded in Cablevision II, “on the 
facts of this case, copies produced by the RS-DVR system are ‘made’ by 
the RS-DVR customer, and Cablevision’s contribution to this 
reproduction does not warrant the imposition of direct liability.”151 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Cablevision’s RS-DVR is a “complex system requiring numerous 
computers, processes, networks of cables, and facilities staffed by 
personnel twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week.”152  The 
system takes a giant leap forward in DVR technology by allowing 
television watchers to time-shift television programs without the need for 
a set-top DVR.  In recording the data, however, the RS-DVR buffers the 
content through two areas of RAM, both of which occur independently 
of any customer input.  One area of RAM reformats the data to make it 
more efficient; the other runs a query to determine whether any existing 
customer record requests exist for the currently buffered content.  No 
area of RAM in the RS-DVR holds more than 1.2 seconds of 
programming data. 
The Second Circuit concluded that 1.2 seconds was insufficiently 
permanent to constitute a fixed copy as required by the Copyright Act.  
As such, the court held the RS-DVR’s RAM-based copying lawful and 
validated Cablevision’s decision not to seek additional licenses in 
implementing its RS-DVR service.  The court provided a timeline 
analysis for determining when an embodiment in a copy is sufficiently 
permanent to be fixed.  It concluded that several minutes is a sufficient 
time to consider an embodiment fixed and 1.2 seconds is insufficient.  
Furthermore, the court noted that some factors could substantially change 
the analysis. 
The purpose-based analysis provides a superior method for 
determining when RAM-based copies are sufficiently permanent as to be 
fixed.  Contrary to the timeline analysis, the purpose-based analysis 
looks at how the data are being used and is able to provide both a clear 
guideline for courts to apply to diverse factual scenarios as well as avoid 
the unfairness and hypertechnical evaluations inevitable with the timeline 
analysis.  The purpose-based analysis provides that an embodiment of 
                                                     
 151. Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 133. 
 152. Id. at 125 (quoting Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp. 
(Cablevision I), 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 
Cablevision II, 536 F.3d 121). 
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data in a copy is fixed when it is sufficiently permanent such that it can 
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period or use 
greater than moving the data from place to place.  Applying the purpose-
based analysis to Cablevision II, the primary ingest buffer would likely 
have met the duration requirement, and the data would have been 
sufficiently fixed as to constitute a copy under the Copyright Act.  
Finally, the timeline analysis is intrinsically tied to the underlying 
technology at issue and thereby runs counter to the Supreme Court’s 
admonition to embrace the basic purpose of the Copyright Act.  In 
contrast, the purpose-based analysis, by providing a rational, media-
neutral means to evaluate copyright infringement claims, gives courts a 
way to determine the permanence of data embodiments while following 
the spirit of Sony. 
